Final Exam

- The final will take place Tuesday December 9, 2008 from 12:30-3:00 PM in PAC 9.
- There will be a list of Q&A maintained on the website; you can email me questions any time.
- You can bring a crib sheet that is in your handwriting, not computer-printed to the final exam. It must be on a **letter-size** $(8.5^{\circ} \times 11^{\circ})$ sheet of paper. (No magnifying glasses!) You can use both sides.
- Office availability is TBA and will be kept up to date on the website.
- A practice exam (Fall 07) is available on the course website; solutions are on ACE.
- Some sample problems are given at the end of this handout.
- There will be a mix of short answer and long questions. About 1/4 of the exam is each on: pure strategies & equilibria; mixed strategies & equilibria; extensive games; strategic games.
- Public Service Announcement: if you want to apply for an Undergraduate Research Assistantship, which is a 4-month program paying about \$2500/month, visit

http://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/Cand0_Dept/SummerResearch/ura2009ad.shtml

Potential Question Topics

partial combinatorial game.

a. . .

x 7

Strategic Games / Fundamentals

No: Old proof of Zermelo's theorem.	
Population games. Solving LPs by hand.	
Performing the tableau method for the	
Lemke-Howson algorithm. Fixed-point	
theorems.	
Extensive Games	
No: Mixed SPEs, behavioural strategies.	
Cake-cutting.	
Cake-cutting.	
Impartial Combinatorial Games	
No: Game products, squebblecross.	

Yes:

Final Projects No: Everything.

We guarantee that on the final exam, any specific games we have seen such as duopoly, Bowling, etc., that appear will include a full definition. You can assume all payoff functions are Bernoulli with vN-M preferences.

Some Suggested Study Problems

Note: this list is not meant to be complete!

- Strategic Games
 - Show that if a 2×2 game has more than 3 mNE's, it has an infinite number of mNE's.
 - Exercises 117.2, 130.2 from Osborne.
 - Make a strategic game, find its mNE using http://banach.lse.ac.uk/form.html, and check by hand that the support characterization holds.
 - Show that if (α_1, α_2) and (α'_1, α'_2) are mNE of a 2-player zero-sum game, so is (α_1, α'_2) .
 - (hard) Prove that the result of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies doesn't matter on the order of elimination.
- Extensive Games: 156.2c, 176.2, 177.2, 210.2, 211.1, 227.2, and Section 7.6.2 from Osborne.
- Impartial Combinatorial Games
 - Create your own take-and-break game and compute the Grundy values.
 - Play Nim against the computer and win at http://gotofreegames.com/nim/free_ nim_puzzle.htm (choose "Computer (2)" if you want to go first).