### Selfish Load Balancing







$$\cot(1) = \cot 2 = l_j$$

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 $cost(i) = l_{A(i)}$ social cost= maximum load

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#### An example









#### An example







#### Outline

- Pure Nash Equilibrium.
- Identical machines
  - Price of Anarchy.
  - Transforming to NE.
- Uniformly related machines
  - Price of Anarchy.
  - Finding NE.

#### Proposition

• Every instance of load balancing has at least one pure NE.

- An assignment A induces a sorted load vector  $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, ..., \lambda_m)$
- If its not a NE then an agent could change getting a smaller sorted vector.

# Identical machines Price of Anarchy.

 $\operatorname{cost}(A) = \max(w_3, w_1 + w_2)$ 



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#### Optimum cost



#### Optimum cost



$$opt(G) = 3$$



$$\cot(A) = 4$$



$$\frac{\cot(A)}{\cot(G)} = \frac{4}{3} = 2 - \frac{2}{3} = 2 - \frac{2}{m+1}$$



## Price of Anarchy

 $PoA(m) = \max_{G \in \mathcal{G}(m)} \max_{P \in Nash(G)} \frac{cost(P)}{opt(G)}$ 

#### Theorem

 Consider an instance G of the load balancing game and an assignment A that is a NE. Then

$$cost(A) \le \left(2 - \frac{2}{m+1}\right) opt(G)$$

Hence

$$PoA(m) \le 2 - \frac{2}{m+1}$$

# Tightness of bound

m tasks of size mm tasks of size 1

 $\cot(A) = 2m$ 



# Tightness of bound

m tasks of size mm tasks of size 1

opt(G) = m + 1



# Tightness of bound

m tasks of size mm tasks of size 1

$$\frac{\operatorname{cost}(A)}{\operatorname{opt}(G)} = \frac{2m}{m+1} = \left(2 - \frac{2}{m+1}\right)$$



- Suppose the highest load is given to machine 1.
- This machine has at least 2 assignments.
- Consider the smallest assignment of machine one (assume its assignment I).

$$l_j \ge l_1 - w_1 \ge \operatorname{cost}(A) - \frac{1}{2}\operatorname{cost}(A) = \frac{1}{2}\operatorname{cost}(A)$$



$$cost(A) \le \frac{2m}{m+1} opt(G) = \left(2 - \frac{2}{m+1}\right) opt(G)$$

# Identical machines Moving to a NE.

# Changing to a NE.

- Max-weight best response policy: activate an unsatisfied agent with the highest weight.
- An activated agent then chooses a best response.

#### Theorem

Every agent gets activated at most once.
 Hence we get to a NE in linear time.

- What does being satisfied mean?
- A best response doesn't decrease the minimum load.

• Consider an agent that was already activated and now is unsatisfied.





 $l_{j*} \le l_j + w_k \le l_j + w_i$ 

• Consider an agent that was already activated and now is unsatisfied.



 $l_{j*} \le l_j + w_k \le l_j + w_i$ 

# Uniformly related machines.

this bound is also tight.

#### Price of Anarchy.

For a NE the following inequality is satisfied:

$$cost(A) = \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{\log m}{\log \log m}\right) \operatorname{opt}(G)$$

- We will show that  $c = \left| \frac{\operatorname{cost}(A)}{\operatorname{opt}(G)} \right| \le \Gamma^{-1}(m)$
- This will prove it because

$$\Gamma^{-1}(m) \sim \frac{\log m}{\log \log m}$$

- Assume that the machines are labeled such that  $s_1 \ge s_2 \ge s_3 \dots \ge s_m$
- $L_k = \max\{k : l_i \ge k * \operatorname{opt}(G) \forall i \le k\}$



- $L_k = \max\{k : l_i \ge i * \operatorname{opt}(G) \forall i \le k\} = \{1, 2, \dots L_k\}$
- $L_k \ge (k+1)L_{k+1} (0 \le k \le c-2)$
- $L_{c-1} \ge 1$
- $m = L = L_0 \ge (c 1)! = \Gamma(c)$  and  $\Gamma^{-1}(m) \ge c$

• First we will see that  $L_{c-1} \ge 1$  by means of a contradiction.



 $l_1 < (c-1) * \operatorname{opt}(G)$ 

- First we will see that  $L_{c-1} \ge 1$  by means of a contradiction.
- $l_1 < (c-1) \cdot \operatorname{opt}(G) + \frac{w_i}{s_1} \leq (c-1) \cdot \operatorname{opt}(G) + \operatorname{opt}(G) \leq c \cdot \operatorname{opt}(G),$



#### Lemma

- $L_k \ge (k+1)L_{k+1} \ (0 \le k \le c_2)$
- Let  $A^*$  be an optimum assignment. If  $A(i) \in L_{k+1}$ then  $A^*(i) \in L_k$

• Let  $q = \min \operatorname{index} L - L_k$ 



- Let  $q = \min \operatorname{index} L L_k$
- $A(i) \in L_{k+1} \to l_{A(i)} \ge (k+1) \operatorname{opt}(G)$
- Claim:  $w_i > s_q * \operatorname{opt}(G)$

- Let  $q = \min \operatorname{index} L L_k$
- $A(i) \in L_{k+1} \to l_{A(i)} \ge (k+1) \operatorname{opt}(G)$
- Claim:  $w_i > s_q * \operatorname{opt}(G)$
- By contradiction assume otherwise.
- Move task i to machine q

$$\ell_q + \frac{w_i}{s_q} < k \cdot \operatorname{opt}(G) + \operatorname{opt}(G) \le \ell_{A(i)},$$

- By contradiction assume  $A^*(i) = j$  and  $j \in L \setminus L_k$
- Then load of machine j (in assignment A\*) is at least

$$\frac{w_i}{s_j} > \frac{s_q \cdot \operatorname{opt}(G)}{s_j} \ge \operatorname{opt}(G)$$

#### Lemma

• Let  $A^*$  be an optimum assignment. If  $A(i) \in L_{k+1}$ then  $A^*(i) \in L_k$ 

- **Recall that**  $A(i) \in L_{k+1} \rightarrow l_{A(i)} \ge (k+1) \operatorname{opt}(G)$
- An optimum assignment must assign  $\sum_{j \in L_{k+1}} (k+1) * \operatorname{opt}(G) * s_j$  to the machines  $L_k$

- Hence  $\sum_{j \in L_{k+1}} (k+1) \cdot \operatorname{opt}(G) \cdot s_j \leq \sum_{j \in L_k} \operatorname{opt}(G) \cdot s_j.$
- Dividing by opt(G) and substracting

$$\sum_{j\in L_{k+1}} s_j$$

$$\sum_{j\in L_{k+1}}k\cdot s_j\leq \sum_{j\in L_k\setminus L_{k+1}}s_j.$$

• Let  $s^*$  be the slowest machine of  $L_{k+1}$ , then for all  $j \in L_{k+1}$ ,  $s_j \ge s^*$  and for all  $j \in L_k \setminus L_{k+1}$ ,  $s_j \le s^*$ Hence,

$$\sum_{j\in L_{k+1}}k\cdot s_j\leq \sum_{j\in L_k\setminus L_{k+1}}s_j. \longrightarrow \sum_{j\in L_{k+1}}k\cdot s^*\leq \sum_{j\in L_k\setminus L_{k+1}}s^*,$$



**Hence,**  $(k+1) * L_{k+1} \le |L_k|$ 

$$\sum_{j \in L_{k+1}} k \cdot s^* \leq \sum_{j \in L_k \setminus L_{k+1}} s^*, \longrightarrow k * L_{k+1} \leq |L_k| - |L_{k+1}|$$

**Hence,** 
$$(k+1) * L_{k+1} \le |L_k|$$

#### Q.E.D

# Computing NE.

 Largest processing time algorithm: inserts task in a nonincreasing order and assigns them in a best response manner.

#### Theorem

Largest processing time algorithm finds a NE.

- Induction on the number of tasks.
- Suppose for t-1 it is good.Add task t.
- What can go wrong?

$$\frac{\sum_{i \in A^{-1}(j^*)} w_i}{s_{j^*}} \le \frac{\sum_{i \in A^{-1}(j)} w_i + w_t}{s_j} \le \frac{\sum_{i \in A^{-1}(j)} w_i + w_k}{s_j}$$

#### Conclusion

**Table 20.1.** The price of anarchy for pure andmixed equilibria in load balancing games onidentical and uniformly related machines

	Identical	Uniformly related
Pure	$2 - \frac{2}{m+1}$	$\Theta\left(\frac{\log m}{\log\log m}\right)$
Mixed	$\Theta\left(\frac{\log m}{\log\log m}\right)$	$\Theta\left(\frac{\log m}{\log\log\log m}\right)$

#### Conclusion

- Reaching a NE in the uniformly related instances.
- More realistic representations.